Blog:Visions of Modernism Part 2: How'd we get here?

In my post, Visions of Modernism Part 1: Fátima & sins of the flesh, I reviewed how, when Our Lady of Fatima warned Jacinta, one of the three shepherd children,

The sins which cause most souls to go to hell are the sins of the flesh.^[1]

As discussed in the post, the difference between the sinful state of 1917 and today is one of scale not kind, with that scale created by the levers of technology that today dispenses "scandal"^[2] with neither limits nor cessation. Bombs are now nuclear. Pornography is now virtual.

While of a kind, albeit on a vast scale, we have also changed the degree of sin. Contraception makes even conjugial sex sinful. Pornography entices, then numbs its viewers to the despicable and cruel. Advertising leverages our concupiscence, targeting even "the little ones." We carry instruments of sin in our pockets, and our educators, politicians, and professionals are "scandalous" not from the public outrage they may or ought to cause, as the modern world defines it, but from the sin they lead others to.^[3]

Sin has always been the rule and not the exception, but within my lifetime it has gone from the unspoken to the entirely public.

How did we get here?

I heard an interesting statistic, that the percentage of professed atheists of 1970 in America, 3%, is now up to 4%. You'd think it'd be far higher, until you realize that most of the other 96%, who, to some extent profess belief in a higher power, or "spirituality," don't believe in the living God. The academics will attribute the decline in denominational faith to decline in trust in institutions, both secular and religious^[4] and growth in "personal autonomy" in recent generations.^[5]

The reference to "personal autonomy is closer to the truth, but only as an observation and not a causal explanation:

"how valuing personal autonomy generally and autonomy in the sphere of sex and drugs specifically explain generational differences..."^[6]

According to this sociological paper, "Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference," changes in "attitudes regarding sex and drugs" resulting from the1960s "culture shock" has led to divergent political identification, left and right, which then impacts religious affiliation.^[7] The authors present data that show that since 1990, self-identified liberals and moderates have increasingly stated "no religious preference," while degrees of self-identified conservatives have shown moderate increases in that identification. Political "moderates" demonstrate the highest divergence, trending similarly with "slightly conservative" to a strong divergence upward starting in the 1990s.^[8]

There are a number of problems with aligning political and religious preferences, and the authors get into rather impressive statistical analysis to accommodate political preference change over time. Still, "moderate" in 1972 is vastly different from whatever that may mean today.^[9] The label carries no particular meaning other than political ambiguity, which regularly swings left and right. To quote Lynyrd Skynryd, "Watergate does not bother me." Nor did it when, in the 1970s I identified as a liberal Democrat.

But the author's real aim is to show that "political affiliation" and not "secularization" has led to the significant increase in the "nones" category of those professing no religious affiliation. Consistent with the statistic I heard regarding unchanging percentages of self-proclaimed atheists, most of these "nones" cling to some degree of spirituality.

The authors' point is that longstanding sociological explanations of growing non-religiosity as the result of "secularization," itself the result of "modernization," cannot explain the growing numbers of "nones" who still believe in some kind of god. The argument is, literally, academic:

Secularization may have once been a rather specific set of hypotheses, but over time its meaning has defused to the point where almost any downtrend in a religious indicator counts as evidence of it. We take a rather textbook slant on it here, stipulating that for secularization to explain the rise of the “nones,” the sequence must accord with the original theory. First, modernization induces people to lose faith in God and religion. Then, as religion is no longer meaningful, they stop identifying with it. ^[10]

They state that the "classic version" of the secularization hypothesis is that "modernization, reason, and science would banish traditional explanations of the material world," thereby replacing religion.^[11] In their view, that the "nones" maintain religiosity negates the hypothesis. The authors explain away the decline in liberal church attendance to "alienation and not action,"^[12] i.e., people just aren't interested in going to church (alienation) but still maintain their religious beliefs (no action). In their conclusion, however, the authors fully reveal themselves,

If some churches were to diversify their message, appealing to issues beyond sexual politics, perhaps the alienated liberals might think about church again.^[13]

Well, the authors don't consult Scripture. If they did, they would understand that belief in sexual "autonomy" is entirely inconsistent with God's instruction, so churches that "appeal to issues beyond sexual politics" -- i.e, churches that embrace abortion, homosexuality -- necessarily preach only parts of the Gospel, or reinterpret its inconvenient parts to suit their politics.

No wonder these churches have empty pews.

"Empty" pews

When pews are filled, they are filled with sinners. Every empty pew is a marker for an unrepentant sinner, who finds "spiritual" solace elsewhere, say in the "spirituality" section of the book store (with its flurry of books on Gnosticism), healing crystals, TV shows on witches, and meditation fads.

The problem facing our leftist evangelicals is that in today's world there is nothing left to give to God. Caesar has it all. Why bother going to church to hear about homosexuality and abortion when it is affirmed everywhere else? Our friends in the academy miss that "Holy" means "set apart," and when a church merely regurgitates the rest of society, there is nothing holy in it.

↑ The warning came two years later in Lisbon. See Lucia's Memoirs, p 127
↑ Per CCC 2284, Scandal is "an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil"
↑ Scandal, as we reviewed in isions of Modernism Part 1: #Scandal,_1917, is "an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil" (CCC 2284)
↑ Why Millennials are less religious than older Americans | Pew Research Center
↑ Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012 (sociologicalscience.com) (Destination page has link to full article.)
↑ Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference The thesis is that the 1990s growth in conservative religious groups caused a more general weaker personal [relgious] identification" (p. 423)
↑ p. 424. Also, "The increased tendency to answer no religious affiliation coincided with the polarization of American politics." (p. 425)
↑ In 1972, 4% of moderates, slightly conservative and conservatives stated no religious preference; by 2012 it was about 8% of conservatives, 10% of slightly conservatives and about 18% of moderates (figures estimated from the chart here: "Figure 2: No Religious Preference (percent) by Year and Political Views: Adults, United States, 1974–2012," p. 427 and from text p. 443.)
↑ Or, today's libertarians qualify as "conservative."
↑ p. 428
↑ p. 424
↑ p. 444
↑ p. 444

[1] The warning came two years later in Lisbon. See Lucia's Memoirs, p 127

[2] Per CCC 2284, Scandal is "an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil"

[3] Scandal, as we reviewed in isions of Modernism Part 1: #Scandal,_1917, is "an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil" (CCC 2284)

[4] Why Millennials are less religious than older Americans | Pew Research Center

[5] Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012 (sociologicalscience.com) (Destination page has link to full article.)

[6] Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference The thesis is that the 1990s growth in conservative religious groups caused a more general weaker personal [relgious] identification" (p. 423)

[7] . 424. Also, "The increased tendency to answer no religious affiliation coincided with the polarization of American politics." (p. 425)

[8] In 1972, 4% of moderates, slightly conservative and conservatives stated no religious preference; by 2012 it was about 8% of conservatives, 10% of slightly conservatives and about 18% of moderates (figures estimated from the chart here: "Figure 2: No Religious Preference (percent) by Year and Political Views: Adults, United States, 1974–2012," p. 427 and from text p. 443.)

[9] Or, today's libertarians qualify as "conservative."

[10] . 428

[11] . 424

[12] . 444

[13] . 444

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